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This study takes an unusual view of what would happen
should we have to leave our facilities and the bases in the
Philippines. Most studies review the most available alterna-
tives, catalog their many faults, and conclude that we must
retain our facilities in the Philippines because we have no
better sites from which to accomplish our missions.
This study assumes that since we need a permanent, strong
U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, instead of having to cope
with the changing attitudes of any local government, the
U.S. would be better served by locating and purchasing a
permanent U.S. site, and building new facilities there. The
site proposed is Malampaya Sound, on the Philippine island
of Palawan.
This innovative approach would reduce friction with the
Filipinos over U.S. facilities* proximity to population
centers, jurisdictional disputes stemming from status of
forces agreements, and affronts to Philippine "honor and
dignity," while enhancing U.S. naval and air capabilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States presence in the Philippines has always
been a subject of low-key controversy in the U.S. The
various issues have been considered more suitable for aca-
demic argument than as something requiring action. In the
beginning the controversy centered on the question of
independence, but after World War II, the topic shifted to
economics. However, since Marcos came to power, the U.S.
bases have gained attention.
This attention is not going to die down in the near
future, and may well require some decisions and action on
the part of the United States. The bases agreement is due
for review in 1988, and it expires in 1991. The government
in the Philippines has to face an election in 1987. All of
these are guaranteed to keep the subjects of the United
States presence in the Philippines and the U.S. bases in the
Philippines on the front pages of newspapers worldwide.
Elections and reviews of the bases agreement are always
times when the populace of the Philippines thinks a lot
about the role of the U.S. government vis-a-vis the Philippine
Islands, and particularly now, when the U.S. appears to some
to be supporting an unpopular regime in Manila.
In addition, the recent Sino-British discussion and
agreement on the future of Hong Kong has acquainted the
people of the world, but most especially those in Southeast
Asia, with the idea that the traditional forms of interaction
between Asian and Western governments are not necessarily
the way things will always be.
So, even though the question of "what about" the U.S.
bases in the R.P. is not new, and several studies have been
done and articles written, it is time for the U.S., especially
the U.S. Navy, to take a serious look at the question,
and make some decisions . Twenty years lead time was not
too little for the British in Hong Kong, and five years
lead time is not too little for the Navy to decide what it
needs and wants in Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Our
planning should not be concerned only with "what if" cases,
such as where we would go if we had to leave the Philippines.
We should look at all facets of the U.S. presence in South-
east Asia, determine the best course, and take positive
action.
Even with all the benefits accruing from the U.S. facili-
ties in the Philippines, questions often arise as to whether
we should stay. Most of these questions revolve around the
strategic question of whether we still need to be in that
location and, if not, then where should we be?
Though there is no universal agreement amongst the
experts about the strategic necessity of a U.S. presence in
Southeast Asia, most studies have affirmed that the U.S.
does need to be in Southeast Asia and that since we have,
strategically and physically, no better place to go, that
10
we should stay. Some writers, though, have said that we
should not admit that we MUST be anywhere, and that because
of the new missile-type war we can move, while there are
those who advocate that we pull out of the Philippines right
now.
In any case, no study says that the facilities at Clark
and Subic are intrinsically necessary. They are good, and
currently our fallback position is not perfect, but there
is no question that the U.S. could continue to operate in
that part of the world even without the Philippine bases.
It might be very expensive, and a lot of bother, but it is
quite possible.
So, since the discussion seems stalemated on the point
that there is no adequate alternative to the U.S. facili-
ties at the Philppine bases and given that the subject of
the U.S. presence in the Philippines is only going to become
more volatile in the next seven years, this paper will
attempt to view this vital question from another direction.
Instead of looking at what we have, and what we would
do if we had to leave, this paper proposes that we instead
look at what our interests in the area are, what we really
need, and the best way to ensure it.
This author believes that the U.S. does need to have a
strong, and a continuing, presence in Southeast Asia, and
further that the current Clark-Subic location is not the
best place to be. It is militarily useful, but is becoming
a political hot spot and liability.
11
Since the current Philippine base location generates
problems, and since there are no suitable alternative
sites for a major and continuing U.S. military basing presence,
I suggest that the U.S. secure a suitable, uninhabited site
in Southeast Asia, and build there a new air and naval base
complex. I propose that the United States should buy the
northern end of the Philippine island of Palawan, and build
a new base complex at Malampaya Sound, in the northwestern
part of the island.
Such a new base complex in the Philippines can reduce
friction with the Filipinos through remoteness from popula-
tion centers, jurisdictional disputes (stemming from status
of forces agreements) , and affronts to Philippine "honor
and dignity," without any degradation of U.S. naval and
air capability.
12
II. THE PHILIPPINE BASES
The Philippine bases are an important part of the
United States 1 worldwidemilitary role. In June 1983, Adm
Robert J. Long, then Commander in Chief, Pacific, told the
House Foreign Affairs Committee that
The Asia-Pacific region represents our single
largest economic area of interest, and it continues
to grow in importance each year... As our economic
and political interests [there] increase, so must
our interest in its security .. .We also need to ensure
that this vast industrial and technological capability
remains oriented to the free world and does not come
under the domination or influence of the Soviet
Union or other unfriendly powers.
The Soviet military capability in the Asia-
Pacific region continues to grow... This sharply
enhances the USSR's ability to project power
throughout the entire Pacom area. Their access to
facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang give the
Soviets the capability to conduct operations any-
where in Southeast Asia, at their choosing. .. [Their
ally] the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has the
largest armed force in the region and poses a
potential threat to Thailand... [In Northeast Asia]
the Soviets pose an increased threat to Japan, as
does North Korea....!
The strategic importance of the Philippines to our
ability to meet this threat and to overlook our economic
interests is readily apparent from looking at a globe. The
Philippines sits astride the vital sea and air lanes of the
Western Pacific and the gateways to the Indian Ocean. U.S.
forces in the Philippines are ideally positioned to give
the U.S. maximum flexibility in responding to crises in that
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Fiaure 1. The Philippines, Geographical Setting
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The military facilities at Clark Air Base, Subic Naval
Base, and elsewhere in the Philippines provide U.S. forces
with a wide variety of important services which are essen-
tial to maintaining the following military capabilities in
and adjacent to the region:
- A continuous air and naval presence in the Western
Pacific (within four flying hours or five sea days to Japan,
Guam, Singapore, and Korea) with the capability to project
and support a U.S. presence at Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean (within eight flying hours or eight sea days)
;
- Air and naval capability to meet contingencies outside
the Western Pacific, such as in the Persian Gulf, Arabian
Sea, East African waters and the Middle East;
- A high state of readiness of U.S. operational forces
in the Pacific;
- Comprehensive support for all operating forces in the
area, including communications, logistics, maintenance,
training and personnel requirements;
- One of the best protected deep-water harbors available
in Southeast Asia;
- The largest, most efficient ship repair facility in
the Pacific;
- Major war reserve materiel storage for a variety of
contingencies;
- An effective counterbalance in the area to the growing
military power of the Soviet Union and its surrogates;
15
- Support for our treaty commitments in East Asia;
- Support for ASEAN and strengthening of U.S. ties to
2ASEAN countries.
In addition to this long list of American interests in
the region which are fulfilled by the Philippine bases, are
the American interests in the Republic of the Philippines
itself, which tend to focus on the following:
- Retaining the Philippines as a friend and ally so as
to permit relatively unencumbered use of local military
facilities
;
- Maintaining U.S. investments and special economic
privileges in the country, while expanding U.S. and multi-
lateral trade on mutually beneficial terms;
- Encouraging the market economy of the Philippines to
succeed, thereby averting socioeconomic chaos and/or politi-
cal radicalism;
- Placing the U.S . -Philippine "special relationship" on
a more modern footing, thereby reducing its emotional and
mendicant aspects;
- Encouraging the Marcos government to liberalize its
3treatment of political opponents.
A. U.S. FACILITIES
The U.S. has two major installations in the Philippines--
Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base--which enable us to
take advantage of the strategic location of the Philippines
in our efforts to look after our interests. We also operate
16
several smaller supporting activities, such as San Miguel
Naval Communications Station (25 miles north of Subic), one
of the primary communication stations in the Western
Pacific; Wallace Air Station, which provides a portion of
the radar coverage for the air defense of the main Philippine
island andhas a drone launch facility for PACAF intercept
training; and John Hay Air Base, a rest and recreation center
for U.S. personnel. The U.S. also has use of Crow Valley
Weapons Range at Clark, with extensive bombing, gunnery and
electronic warfare ranges, and the Zambales Range on the
Zambales Peninsula opposite Subic Bay, where the complete
4
range of amphibious equipment and tactics can be utilized
(see Figures 2 and 3)
.
Many of the facilities located at these bases are either
the largest ones in existence outside of the U.S. (for
example, the entire Subic Bay naval complex) , or are the
only ones in existence outside of the U.S. (like the Crow
Valley Weapons Range). These facilities, because of their
size, complexity and co-location, offer advantages which
cannot currently be duplicated anywhere in the Pacific.
B. BASING ARRANGEMENTS
The U.S. has had facilities at Subic Bay since 1901,
when it was decided that Subic was superior to Cavite Bay,
and the old Spanish installation there as well as the lands
around Subic Bay were placed under the control of the Navy
Department. The history of the bases is interesting, and
17
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long. More relevant to this study is the history of the
current U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Agreement.
Negotiations were commenced in 1945 to establish air
and naval bases in the Republic of the Philippines with a
view to ensuring the territorial integrity of the Philip-
pines, the mutual protection of the United States and the
Republic of the Philippines, and the maintenance of peace
in the Pacific. The Military Base Agreement was signed
on 14 March 1947. The initial agreement was effective
for 9 9 years and provided for use, free of rent, of Clark
Air Force Base, Subic Naval Base, and various other smaller
facilities. The bases established thereby were U.S. bases
with free access for U.S. public vessels and aircraft and
with full authority for operational use and control. Since
1947, the bases agreement has been amended 42 times includ-
ing the 1983 review. In 1966, the fixed term of the bases
was reduced from the 80 years remaining on the original 99
year term to 25 years (until 1991) with the agreement to
continue indefinitely thereafter subject to termination by
either side on one year notice. Under the 1979 agreements,
the bases became Philippine bases with U.S. facilities
located therein; a substantial amount of excess land was
returned; the U.S. was assured unhampered military operations;
and, an economic aid and military security assistance package
was negotiated contemporaneously with the amendment. The
1979 amendments also provided for a complete review of the
20
agreement every five years. The 1983 review responded in
a number of ways to Philippine sovereignty concerns, estab-
lished a joint committee to help work out MBA-related
problems, and maintained U.S. freedom of operation for the
facilities. In addition, President Reagan pledged the best
efforts of the executive branch towards obtaining $900 million
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III. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE U.S. BASES
Why propose that we change our present facilities in
the Philippine Islands? They nestle in a country with which
we have had (relatively) good relations for almost a century,
where the people really like us and are, on the whole, glad
that the U.S. is there. The bases are strategically located,
far better than any currently-owned American property in
the Western Pacific. They are large, complete, and complex
facilities. Finally, but not least, the Philippines are
probably the favorite liberty land for most American
servicemen. What good would it do to move?
Actually, both the United States and the Philippines
would be better off if the U.S. were to buy a new site and
move there. Most importantly, both countries would benefit
from the political distance which would be created by such a
move: it would weaken the argument that the U.S. controls
Marcos either because the U.S. needs the bases or because
Marcos needs close U.S. presence to strengthen him. It
would defuse the argument that the bases are dangerous because
they attract nuclear attack, and it would eliminate most
of the problems which arise around the question of
jurisdiction.
Turning over the airstrip, harbor and land to the
government of the Philippines would give them excellent
possibilities for commercial expansion, without causing
23
problems in overcrowded Manila. With the U.S. away from
Manila, businessmen in other parts of the Philippines would
have a chance to get the U.S. contracts, giving an economic
boost to their areas. (The government of the Philippines is
very interested in fostering economic growth in rural
areas.) In the long run, it would be cheaper for the U.S.,
too. With complete control of the facilities and the sur-
rounding uninhabited area, costs could be managed much as
in Diego Garcia, with short-term labor contracts, etc. It
would also lessen the costs from theft at the present location
How do the majority of the people in the Republic of
the Philippines feel about the U.S. presence? Do they want
the U.S. to stay or to go?
Undeniably, the people of the Philippines are friendly
toward America and Americans. But it is, as one Filipino
writer put it, a love-hate relationship on the Filipino
side. At the same time that American activities are
appreciated, and even invited, they are being decried as
interference in Philippine affairs.
A survey of FBIS since January 1981 revealed 19 Filipino
arguments for withdrawing the U.S. presence. The count
would be multiplied if each of the "social problems" caused
by the Americans in the towns around the bases were listed
separately. There are many people and a host of arguments
against having these U.S. facilities in the Philippines.
The bases are the focus of Filipino objections to the
American presence. They are highly visible, and often seem
24
to be the center of the more unpleasant aspects of the
American presence. A broad and recurrent theme is that the
United States, keeping the bases in an attempt to protect
its national security interests, runs rough-shod over the
sovereignty, desires, national interests, and (most impor-
tantly) dignity of the Filipinos.
This theme takes many forms, the most widely- felt of
which is that the United States' payment for the bases
goes to support the current regime (or, as some put it, the
"corrupt Marcos regime") . No matter what the administration
is titled, money from the U.S. for the bases is paid to the
government, and thus supports it.
To the anti-Marcos group, it doesn't matter that the
United States has little choice: it must give the money
for the bases to the Philippine government. Nor does it
make much difference that even without the money for the
bases, Marcos would be in power anyway, just as corrupt and
just as rich. These antagonists have seized a highly-visible,
international attention-getting way to express their dis-
satisfaction with Marcos' regime. Their point of view
appears justified since President Marcos has become the
...first head of state to acquire two ultra-modern
Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopters as personal transport.
Each helicopter, normally configured for combat
roles, costs about US$4 million. [A] Sikorsky
spokesman ... [said] that civilian versions of the
S70C helicopters have been configured as 'executive




(This is in lieu of the eleven fully-equipped troops the
3helicopter is normally configured to carry. )
While this argument concerning U.S. support for Marcos
is a convenient ploy, it does not mean that it is not an
issue with the Filipinos. Many people are unhappy with the
way President Marcos is running the country. Although
they may not believe that the U.S. supports him, they know
that the U.S. money, as well as that from other sources,
does not reach the people but goes instead to Marcos and
his cronies. It makes no difference in their lives if the
bases, and the income from them, stay or leave, but they
sense that closing the U.S. bases could hurt Marcos.
A second popular complaint in the Philippines about the
U.S. bases concerns the way the United States dispenses the
money we pay for the lease of the bases. The amended R.P.-
U.S. Military Bases Agreement, signed 1 June 1983 by the
ambassadors of the U.S. and the R.P. was for a total of
$900 million over a total of five years, with an annual
breakdown of $95 million in military aid and $85 million
in economic aid. The President of the United States stated
in his letter to Philippine President Marcos, of May 31,
1983 that
'the Executive Branch of the United States Government
will, during the five fiscal years beginning on
October 1, 1984, make its best effort to obtain
appropriation of security assistance for the
Philippines,' then specified the amounts. 4
Thus the President will try to persuade Congress, but
only Congress can decide how much of this money should be
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in military, economic and social aid. This has caused
friction in the Philippines ever since Congress began its
proceedings on the amended R.P.-U.S. Military Bases Agree-
ment. As President Marcos emphasized in his speech of 1
June, 19 83,
The Philippines has always treated the package
of appropriations set aside for the bases as payments
in the forms of rentals .. .even President Roxas, . . .and
later, President Quirino, referred to these appro-
priations as rentals and that the Philippine Government
would continue to treat them as such--rentals or as
compensation for the use of the land which is Philippine
territory. But the American Government, however, has
not accepted this nomenclature. We have never quarreled
about this. We discreetly kept this in the background.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee, Asia and Pacific
Subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Congressman Steven
J. Solarz, revised the breakdown of the five-year fee of
$900 million from yearly installments of $95 million for
military aid and $85 million for economic aid, to new
figures of $25 million annually for military aid and $155
million for economic aid. In addition, the committee wanted
to see free and fair elections, respect for human rights,
and a return to democracy. Not surprisingly, Filipinos
see these decisions by the American Congress as interference.
They feel that these are gratuitous demands which denigrate
Philippine sovereignty.
It doesn't matter whether these decisions prove to be
good for the Philippines. To many people there, the issue
is that an agreement was concluded and signed by two sovereign
nations, then one of them tried to change the deal. They
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try to represent it as an illegal attempt by one nation to
control, or exert undue influence over, another. (It was
not an illegal change, especially under the terms of
President Reagan's letter. In fact, this is the way the
U.S. system always works.)
An editorial in the Times Journal (Manila) addressed
this situation:
The Philippines Government and the Filipino people
cannot take lightly foreign intervention in Philippine
affairs, much less the continued "white man's burden"
as far as the "little brown brother" is concerned.
The US Government, for example, cannot demand that
the Philippines adopt its form of democracy lock,
stock, and barrel, in the same way the British
Government could not impose on the American people their
form of parliamentary government...
Only history will report in unbiased language the
form of democracy the Filipino people will evolve but
certainly it will be a democracy suited to the
Filipino mentality, his customs and traditions and
his free-wheeling ways. Revising the U.S.-R.P. Mili-
tary Bases Agreement to press the Philippine Government
into yielding to American pressures will not solve
the problem.'
Another writer, in an article in the Mindanao Times
said
:
We deplore the manner with which the US House of
Representatives ' subcommittee unilaterally revised the
bases agreement and placed the Philippine government
in an embarrassing position.
If the Philippine Government agrees to accept the
new packages of economic and military aid, it will be
tantamount to acknowledging that the $900 million
payment is a US dole-out and not the rental paid for
the use of the bases here. The difference between
"aid" and "rental" is: in the form of "aid" the
Philippines being the recipient has absolutely no
say whatsoever with the payment. While under "rental"
the Philippine Government being the ''lessor" and the
28
US the "lessee," the US Government has no other
choice except to abide by the lease agreement
stipulated between the two parties.
^
This leads into another major problem that the people
in the Philippines see with the American bases so prominent:
so long as those bases remain, the Republic of the Philippines
is not really independent. Filipinos and other Asians
question whether the Philippine government dares make a
decision without considering the possible reactions of the
American government.
In addition, there is some feeling that Marcos is, at
least in part, a puppet of the U.S., and there are many who
feel that if Marcos goes too far, the U.S. will oust him
from office and install someone more pro-U.S. If for no
other reason than to strengthen Philippine sovereignty,
independence and dignity, many would like the U.S. presence
much less visible.
Beside these general reasons for removing the U.S. bases
from their present location in densely populated areas
,
there are several arguments directed against the bases
themselves. The oldest of these arguments, first stated by
former Senator Claro M. Recto, is that the bases are targets
for nuclear attack which will, by proximity, cause great
damage to the Republic of the Philippines. The ABC (Anti-
Bases Coalition) uses this as their main argument, and points
out that the security of the Philippines is not threatened
by any outside power, that the R.P. has no intrinsic need
for these bases, and has no effective control over these
29
bases and their activities. The Philippines, through no
action of its own, and perhaps against its own desires,
may be drawn into any conflict in which the U.S. might be
engaged because of the U.S. use of these bases and even
because of their mere presence. Thus, the bases could be
9
a security threat to the Philippine islands.
One writer goes even further, pointing out that the
primary purpose of the bases is
to protect the United States by fighting a war away
from the American mainland. . .Given the choice, anyone
would rather fight it out any place but their
homeland . 10
Other people are disturbed by the local social effects
spawned by the bases. They complain about the prostitution,
drug abuse, crime, health, sanitation, unemployment, conges-
tion, etc. They insist that part of the money the Philippines
receives for the bases should be earmarked to alleviate these
problems
.
Some people complain that the land occupied by the
bases could be better used for productive purposes such as
agriculture or industry. Another consistent thorny issue
is employment on the bases. Even with regular reviews of
the Base Labor Agreement of 1968, complaints are still
heard about Americans being given preference in employment
over Filipinos, that base labor should be governed by
Philippine labor laws, and that foreign contractors should
have to pay the same taxes as local contractors.
The arguments listed against American influence and the
American bases in the Philippines, as well as other gripes
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such as the U.S. giving so much to unfriendly (namely Central
American) countries while the Republic of the Philippines is
forced to beg for handouts, strike most people as trivial.
But though each may be inconsequential, they add up to an
irritating total.
Nor will they just go away if we ignore them. A
problem ignored usually gets bigger, until a crisis flares
up. Then we are forced to "put out the fire," instead of
finding a solution to the problem.
It is time for the United States government, as well as
the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, to realize that there
is a problem and to take positive steps to solve it. There
is discontent with the American presence in the Republic of
the Philippines. The R.P. is_ an independent, sovereign
nation and it is not the task of the U.S. to solve the prob-
lems of its "little brown brother."
The best course, both for the R.P. and the U.S., would
be for the U.S. to remove its bases to some other location,
which would be just as advantageous and useful for the U.S.,
while at the same time removing the U.S. from the spotlight
shining on Manila. It would eliminate all the arguments
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IV. CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE SITES
Whether or not political and social unrest existed in
the Republic of the Philippines, the prudent planner would
look at the necessity for the U.S. presence there, and what
possible alternatives existed. Many have done so, though
admittedly, the question of alternatives has been given
added urgency by the unrest in the Philippines.
As noted earlier, the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia
is both an intrinsic part of our worldwide defense capability,
and a welcome stabilizing influence in the region. Leaving
the area would be disadvantageous for both the U.S. and
its Asian friends.
All studies which consider possible alternatives to the
U.S. facilities in the Philippines conclude that there is
no perfect alternative. Even those studies which question
the current bases situation in the Philippines conclude that
no other site is a decent replacement, nor could any be
easily or cheaply transformed.
These studies have all examined sites where the U.S.
already has some military or political strength, or con-
sidered sites where there are already ship repair facilities,
especially those with nearby airfields.
This study will first discuss the problems in general,




The primary problem with the suggested alternatives is
that most are too far away to provide adequate support to
the Indian Ocean, and to protect and sustain naval and air
power in the South China Sea. Figure 4, which depicts
distances from Manila, clearly shows the vast distances
involved. Guam is almost 1500 nautical miles from Manila
(2000 from the South China Sea), Palau is 1000, Okinawa over
800, and Australia about 2000. (Some of the problems caused
by this will be covered in detail later.)
A second major problem is that most of these land areas,
particularly those in the Trust Territories of the Pacific,
are small islands, thus limiting what facilities could be
built; with small, untrained populations, necessitating the
importation of labor. These islands have limited resources
which barely support their own populations; everything needed
by the U.S. must be imported.
Some sites in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan
don't have the same problems as the small islands, but they
pose political problems. The Pacific islands, all under
U.S. control or trusteeship, have close relationships with
the U.S. Agreements with Guam or any of the Trust Terri-
tories would not be expected to have the problems associated
with bilateral agreements with a foreign government, such
as future restrictions or treaty abrogation.
Even so, any site considered would require extensive
negotiations for use permits, and to settle details. These
35
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Figure 4. Azimuthal Equidistant Projection, Centered
at Manila
36
would be exhaustive since all the sites except Singapore or
Kaohsiung, Taiwan would require major buildup of facilities
and trained personnel
.
Another problem, not usually considered, is that the
islands proposed for use—Guam, Tinian, Palau--are in the
most typhoon-concentrated part of the Pacific. Figures 5
and 6 show the locations where all the WESTPAC typhoons
between 1952 and 1962 began to form and where they reached
typhoon intensity. Roughly one-third of WESTPAC ' s typhoons
form within 500 nautical miles of Guam. In fact, going
anywhere north or east of Subic Bay increases the likelihood
of typhoon visitations.
The problem of cost, which often seems to be the biggest
problem is covered in detail below.
B. RELOCATION TO GUAM
Guam is the site most frequently considered as an alterna-
tive and provides a good example of the problems. Since the
U.S. already has some facilities there, Anderson Air Force
Base, and the naval station at Apra Harbor, which has a
naval air station and submarine support facilities, Guam
offers the possibility of expansion. Such expansion is,
of course, not without difficulties.
Guam is one of the Marianas Islands, located about 1500
miles east of Subic Bay. It is about 30 miles long and
averages between 5 and 11 miles wide, with a population of
about 96,000. The U.S. Government owns roughly one- third of
37
The "breeding, ground" of WESTFAC's typhoons—from near the F.tjtiator to 25 r K, and from
110° E to 180' E. Triangles show where the 184 typhoons between 1U52-61, inclusive, began to
form. Last two digits indicate calendar year typhoon formed. Eirst two digits indicate
the typhoon's sequence number for that year. 0452 means "4th typhoon in lf)52." 20G1 means "20th
typhoon in 1961," etc. Sole that 34 per cent of typhoons begin to form within 500 S.M. of Guam.
Source: Harding, Edwin T., Heavy Weather Guide
(U.S. Naval Institute, 1965), pp. 32-33
Figure 5. WESTPAC Typhoon Breeding Ground
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Locations in WESTPAC tchcre the 184 tropical disturbances between
1952-61, inclusive, first reached typhoon intensity ( maximum sustained
winds 64 knots or higher). Sole the slight shift in the triangles to
the North and West
Source: Harding, Edwin T. , Heavy Weather Guide
(U.S. Naval Institute, 1965), 'pp. 34-35
Figure 6. WESTPAC Typhoon Beginning Locations
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the land on Guam, and there has been pressure to release
some of it to the Government of Guam. Acquisition of new
property on Guam is severely constrained by commercial
development and urban growth of the civilian population.
Thus it would be difficult, if not impossible, to acquire
additional land on the island.
Even if the land could be acquired, Guam is not large
enough to absorb the basing needs stemming from a move from
the Philippines. Land availability would still be a problem
even if the U.S. exercised the land options we have in the
Northern Marianas and any we might obtain later in Micronesia
There is simply no place large enough to accommodate, for
example, the 4 4,000 acre Crow Valley Weapons Range currently
located at Clark. Moreover, the extreme concentration of
military capability at one location, such as Guam, and the
impact of major expansion on the civilian population are
probably prohibitive considerations.
Construction costs would be substantial. To completely
duplicate on Guam today all the facilities currently located
at Clark and Subic would cost over $2 billion. Some esti-
mates place the costs between $3 and $5 billion.
Support costs would increase. The man/day cost on Guam
is over five times that of the Philippines. It is estimated
that the naval repair work done yearly at Subic would cost
at least $125 million more in Guam. Also, ships and air-
craft would be operating over longer distances with resulting
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increases in operating costs. For example, fuel obtained
from the Persian Gulf would require 10 more sea days per
roundtrip for delivery to Guam than to the Philippines.
These increased support costs would amount to at least $350
million per year.
Because Guam is farther from contingency and operating
areas than the Philippines, additional support ships and
antisubmarine warfare aircraft would be needed to maintain
the level of military operations in the Western Pacific
and Indian Ocean. It is also likely that some additional
air refueling and strategic airlift assets would be required
These additional ships and aircraft would cost at least $4
billion to procure, and several million per year to operate.
Major expansion on Guam would create a work force
problem in terms of numbers, wages, and skills. In many
cases, skilled labor would have to be imported from the
Philippines, Japan, or the United States.
Finally, it is estimated that 5 years would be needed
to complete the relocation, and during the actual relocation
2
a serious gap in capability could exist.
C. TRUST TERRITORIES
The Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (Micro-
nesia) are, along with Guam, often considered as possible
replacement sites for the U.S. facilities in the Philippines.
The area consists of some 2,141 islands with a population
of about 130,000. Since 1947, they have been administered
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by the U.S. under an agreement between the UN Security
Council and the U.S. Congress. The U.S. has authority over,
and responsibility for, TTPI's foreign relations and defense
matters, and is authorized to use some of the islands for
military purposes. The U.S. is also obligated to foster
socioeconomic development of the islands and to prepare them
for eventual self-government. These islands have a variety
of cultures and languages, and each small unit wants its
3
own separate political present and future.
Aside from Guam, only Palau in the entire area possesses
the geographic requirements for both air base and major port
development. Saipan and Tinian, both of which are suitable
for large airfields, have limited harbor facilities. Saipan 's
facilities are minimal; on Tinian, the situation is marginal
even with the impressive artificial harbor constructed during
World War II, which may be adequate for logistic support of
an airbase complex but not for sustained support of seagoing
weapons systems.
Consequently, base development in the Marianas must con-
sider Tinian, Saipan and Guam as an integrated system, a
point frequently overlooked in considering the problem,
particularly in connection with proposals for airfield
. . 4development on Tinian.
Palau is about 500 miles closer to Asia than Guam, but
any base development must start from scratch, which presents
significant economic and political difficulties.
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D. OTHER COUNTRIES
Japan, and Korea are too far north to be practical as
replacements for Subic and Clark, just as Guam is too far
east (see Figure 4) . Okinawa, being part of Japan, has a
skilled, though small, labor base, but an expensive one.
It also has some U.S. military facilities. All U.S. bases
in Okinawa, however, are of limited utility, given our agree-
ment to use them only in defense of Japan. In addition,
the Japanese generally feel that their provision of
facilities to the US Navy is just about at the
saturation point. The political possibilities of




Kaohsiung, on the southwest coast of Taiwan, is an
excellent site in every way except politically. The location
is good. It has a shipyard and nearby military airfield
facilities, with a skilled and extensive labor force which
is not prohibitively expensive. Even though the R.O.C.
would probably welcome us,
the idea that the United States, in total contravention
of the Shanghai Communique and in defiance of our
burgeoning relationship with Beijing, would move
major military installations to Taiwan defies
credibility. '
Therefore, Taiwan is out.
For similar reasons, Hong Kong cannot be considered,
though there is speculation that the government of the
People's Republic of China might allow the U.S. use of the
o
port during a confrontation with the Soviet Union. No
permanent U.S. facility would be likely, or even possible,




The Indochinese peninsula is also unsuitable, Vietnam
and Cambodia for obvious reasons, and Thailand because of
its neutral and independent political position, in line with
that of other nations in the region, and with ASEAN. Thai-
land is concerned with securing its borders and will do
nothing to exacerbate relations on the peninsula.
Singapore, strategically located and with established
shipyard facilities could handle some increased U.S. naval
repairs and possibly some increased military air traffic,
but a significant base in Singapore would require permanent
facilities and this is politically unacceptable to the
Q
Singapore government and to ASEAN. Also, what is considered
to be Singapore's geographical advantage under normal condi-
tions could become its worst enemy in time of war if the
straits were closed and ships were forced to seek alternate
routes between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
Some Australian capabilities might be found, but the
development of Cockburn Sound near Fremantle, besides being
too far from the South China Sea, would require very exten-
sive preparations--on the order of several billion dollars.
Although U.S. access to Australian facilities probably
would be less susceptible to political pressures than in
most of the other areas, and the advantages of working with
a close ANZUS partner are obvious, the long distances make
this option logistically unattractive.
Locations in Malaysia and Indonesia (and Brunei) would
appear to be the most favorable for possible replacement
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bases. These countries lie in the strategic center of the
area, are removed from the mainland, and straddle the
boundary interface between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
These countries also control the key international straits
between the two oceans. These seaways are of prime and
continuing interest to the U.S. These countries appear to
have natural resources which would make them favorable sites:
many ports; a large, relatively inexpensive labor force;
government support for such employment away from major
population centers; and a desire to keep a strong, stabilizing
U.S. presence in Southeast Asia.
Drawbacks include the political instability of these
countries; unskilled labor forces; and the determination of
these countries to remain non-aligned, and to promote smooth
relations in ASEAN which, as a whole, would resist anything
12
with the potential of exacerbating the situation in Vietnam.
E. COSTS
There are several elements which must be factored into
the costs. The cost of purchasing the land, building new
facilities, moving to the new site and, as pointed out in
the discussion about Guam, the new operating and support
costs
.
The cost of purchasing the land is the hardest to esti-
mate. It is dependent on the location chosen, the size,
etc. It is very dependent on U.S. relations with whatever
country owns the land.
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Though the cost of this new land will be high, it must
be weighed against future costs of the current sites. Recent
experience in the Philippines (and other countries) has
shown that the representatives of those countries will work
very hard to get the best possible deal they can for them-
selves. Undoubtedly, each re-negotiation will see the prices
for this land go up. It is these high future costs (as
well as the costs of fallback sites) against which any
purchase price must be measured.
It is also inescapable that building a new site or
expanding an existing one will be costly. The U.S. Govern-
ment estimates that the costs of developing Subic Bay Naval
Base and Clark Air Base 25 years ago were over $1 billion,
and attempting to replace these facilities today would be
13quite expensive—on the order of $3 billion to $5 billion.
Brigadier General Graham, OJCS , told the House Foreign Affairs
committee that "to completely duplicate on Guam today all
the facilities currently located at Clark and Subic would
14
cost over $2 billion." (This is estimated using Guam's
labor costs.) And no site will ever be just exactly the
same as the existing ones.
Without minimizing the very real cost of new facilities,
it should be pointed out that it is not necessary or perhaps
even desirable to duplicate the extant facilities. Along
with any decision to move would come a coordinated analysis
of exactly what facilities and services would be necessary.
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Given such an opportunity to start from scratch, we might
find that our real needs are not exactly those being supplied
by the current facilities. Building new facilities would
give us an excellent opportunity to have exactly what we
want.
Costs are of course dependent on the amount of work
to be done, the location, and the cost of the materials and
labor. Of the skilled labor forces in Asia, the least
expensive workers are in the Philippines, the most expen-
sive in Japan. Wages in Guam and Japan are, respectively,
five and seven times higher than wages in the Philippines.
Materials and labor will have to be brought in to any site,
but a major advantage in Asia comes from the competitive
sources available. Several countries are experienced in
constructing large facilities outside of their homelands.
The U.S. could obtain good prices and good will by contracting
parts of a new site with the different countries 1 firms.
Or, the U.S. could bargain with the R.P. for a trade-off of
a good price for the land for the hiring of mostly Filipino
laborers in the construction.
The costs of building a replacement facility would not
necessarily be wholly in addition to the costs of building
the Philippine sites. Much of what we have can be trans-
ferred to the new site. Moving in itself incurs costs, of
course, but it is probably still cheaper to move typewriters,
trucks, storage sheds, etc., than it would be to ship new
ones from the U.S.
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Another cost-saving factor is that a new site can have
better security, thus cutting down on major losses due to
theft. This is especially true if the new site is not near
any large population center. Though not widely publicized,
the U.S. government, and the sailors and airmen, suffer
losses of over $5 million a year in the Philippines due to
theft.
Costs of a new site, though seemingly cut and dried,
have several variables. These include the cost of the land,
the wages for the labor force used, the extent of the facili-
ties to be built, the moving costs (which is the same as
savings over the purchase of replacements for these same
items) , and the difference in operating costs (both higher
and lower)
.
These costs cannot be looked at in isolation. They must
be compared to the higher costs, both financially and
politically, which will be incurred by the U.S. if we
continue in the present situation.
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V. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SITE
As mentioned, the U.S. must find some viable alternative
site in case we should encounter problems keeping the
Philippine bases. In the last chapter many sites were
discussed and discarded for various reasons . Many were too
far from the South China Sea and Diego Garcia to be useful.
Others were in areas which are too populous, and do not
allow for expansion or the exigencies of military operations.
It became clear that, since no existing site fulfilled
all our needs, and since either moving to another site—or
staying where we are—will inevitably be costly, we should
face the contretemps and look for some location which would
provide the greatest aggregate advantages.
To that end, I propose that the U.S. buy the northern
end of the Philippine island of Palawan, and build a port
and airfield complex in the northwestern part of that island,
in the area of Malampaya Sound.
This site is eminently suitable: it is in a good strate-
gic location; it is sparsely populated and over 200 miles
from even a minor population center; it contains one of the
best natural harbors in Southeast Asia, deep enough to
anchor several deepdraft vessels, and has excellent natural
storm protection.
In addition, this island is in the Philippines. Moving
to this site will not harm our relationship with the people
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of the Philippines. Instead, this increased distance
(both physically and politically) from Manila will be viewed
favorably by all, as would a purchase instead of a lease.
First, I will describe the site, then cover some of the
probable reactions to such a move.
A. PALAWAN ISLAND
Palawan, the fifth largest island of the Philippine
Archipelago, separates the Sulu Sea from the South China Sea.
The north end of the island begins about 250 miles SSW of
Subic Bay, and runs in a southwesterly direction, pointing
at Borneo (see Figure 7) . It has a length of over 275 miles,
a width varying from five to thirty miles, an area of 4,500
square miles, and is surrounded by well over 1100 smaller
islands and islets. The island is very mountainous and
steep with many peaks attaining heights of over 900 m (3000
ft), some over 6000 ft, and is bordered by narrow coastal
strips. The west coast of Palawan consists mostly of hills
and mountain spurs form the high central range. These spurs
terminate in steep slopes or cliffs. The coast is generally
irregular, especially in the north part where there are
many small islands and deep bays. The geologic formation of
Palawan is different from all others in the Philippines, and
no volcanic activity is known to exist.
The island is sparsely inhabited and little is known of
the interior. A good part of the island is covered with






IjnuiftainotM ''' H <Q J*UpK>o l^J ' '"'Co no- (^
_, Pkovinck' '
,J *».«.».o». .j»joT<- ©"'' '
"
tn fit
rfeROVINCE ^. b.^/n.#,« n
• 7'" i»*ticp'-Fi,^
T T>. > ' tk.-rf.... ( i
CUttOM I S
^








Figure 7. Palawan Island
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species. Agricultural development has been limited. Both
Mindoro and Palawan are considered essentially pioneer areas.
In 1970 Palawan had the lowest population density of any of
2the major islands. The census that year showed that Palawan
3had a population of 236,635. This gives an average density
of 52.6 people per square mile for the island. In contrast,
Manila has an average of 9,500 per square mile. This compara-
tively low population density of Palawan has not changed
4in the last 45 years.
B . WEATHER
The weather in the northern part of Palawan at Malampaya
Sound is basically similar to that of the Manila area, but
with much less typhoon activity.
There are two distinct seasons, one dry, in the winter
and spring, and the other wet, in the summer and autumn.
During the wet season (July, August, September) the average
monthly rainfall exceeds 20 inches. During the dry season
(January, February, March), the average rainfall is less
than 1 and 1/2 inches. The average annual rainfall on the
west coast of Palawan averages about 120 inches. The climate
is hot and humid. Visibility is generally good, fog being
rare.
Temperatures are uniformly high but they seldom exceed
9 5 degrees F or fall below 6 5 degrees F. Maximum tempera-
tures occur in April , May and June. The coolest months are
December, January, and February. Relative humidity is
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comparatively high. The annual average is not more than
80 percent, with minimum values recorded in April.
The west coast of Palawan is exposed to the Southwest
Monsoon. It is sheltered from the Northeast Monsoon and
from the trade winds by the mountainous terrain. Typhoons
are infrequent off the west coast of Palawan. Only about
seven percent of the more serious typhoons that affect the
Philippine Islands are experienced in this area. There is
little chance of a typhoon passing off this coast, as most
of them recurve NE before reaching Palawan.
C. MALAMPAYA SOUND
Just north of Cape Ross, the northwest coast of Palawan
is deeply indented by Malampaya Sound, one of the best natural
harbors in the Philippine Islands. It extends about 20
miles southeast and near its head is only 2 and 1/2 miles
from the east coast of Palawan. The sound, which affords
safe anchorage for a large number of deepdraft vessels, is
divided into two parts by the headlands projecting from the
shore, and by several islands. Both the southeastern and
eastern sides of the sound have large areas of low, flat
land suitable for an airfield (see Figure 8)
.
Malampaya Sound is divided into Outer and Inner Sounds
which are connected by an inner strait. At the mouth of the
outer sound sits Tuluran Island, the largest island off the
west coast. The sound is entered from north via Endeavor





Figure 8. Malampaya Sound, Palawan Island
55
Tuluran Island. It can be entered from the west by passing
south of the island. Because of the numerous islets, rocks
and reefs in the strait connecting the inner and outer
sounds, the navigable passage is reduced to a width of about
1/4 mile.
The shores of the sound are generally steep and densely
wooded, rising abruptly from a beach intersected by many
bold headlands, rocky points and small areas of mangrove
swamp. The region in the vicinity of Malampaya Sound is
sparsely inhabited.
A small town, Liminangoog, lies just south of Relinquish
Head on the northern coast at the entrance to Malampaya
Sound. Another small village, Binaluann, lies just a little
further in, on the north coast of the outer sound. There
are about three other small towns on the northern part of
Palawan. All of these are small villages which make their
living from fishing.
D. THE PEOPLE
The largest town on the island is located in the center
point of the eastern coast. This town, Puerto Princesa, is
15 miles from the location of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm,
one of the four penal colonies in the Philippines. Estab-
lished in 1904, it is one of the world's oldest and largest
prisons without bars. It is intended to be a place for
reformation for prisoners of good conduct and to give deserv-
ing prisoners the chance to live with their families on the
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colony farm. Ex- colonists who wish to remain can even home-
stead on a settlement at the south end of the colony.
This prison has become the major, if not the only,
tourist attraction of the islands. Every morning a blue
jeepney crowded with holiday-makers leaves Puerto Princesa
for Iwahig to allow the tourists to enjoy swimming, camping,
hunting, shell-collecting and scuba diving--all within the
boundaries of the colony. The prison has no security checks
at its gates, letting the tourist jeepney in, and allowing
an average of eight prisoners a month a chance to escape.
Not to worry, there is an 80-85% recapture rate. (Prisoners
are easily recognizable in the small barrios around Iwahig;
the villagers themselves often report escapees to the police.)
About 30 nm NE of Palawan is the island of Culion,
which, along with its several adjacent islands, makes up
Culion Reservation, the leper colony of the Philippines.
Many people think this island is much closer to Palawan than
it actually is, sometimes confusing it with the penal colony.
E. THE MOROS OF PALAWAN AND THE NPA
Many people ask if there might not be problems, moving
into an area in the southern Philippines where there might
be trouble from the Moros, especially their militant activist
faction, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the
New People's Army (NPA), the "communist" insurgents. Actually,
though Palawan is considered a Moro island, because of its
low population, there have been none of the conflicts between
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the Moros and the Christians which occur in the other islands
The same is true for the NPA which, if it exists on the
island, has shown no activity.
1 . Moros
Ninety percent of all Filipinos are Christian. The
remaining 10 percent is comprised of the unassimilated
Chinese and the Moros (Muslim Filipinos) . The Moros are
principally located in the coastal lowlands of southern
Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and the southern end of
Palawan.
Moros are divided into at least ten groups, differ-
ing in language and degree of Muslim orthodoxy. The four
most important groups are the Magindanao and Maranao of the
Illana Bay area of southern Mindanao and the Tausug and
Samal of the Sulu Archipelago and the Zamboanga peninsula;
the Melabuganon of southern Palawan; and a tiny group known
as the Jama Mapun on the Cagayan Islands in the Sulu Sea.
Together they numbered approximately 1.6 million in the 19 70
census
.
Despite the differences among and between the various
groups, Moros have demonstrated considerable solidarity when
confronted with a perceived threat from the outside. To a
large extent this solidarity stems from a fear that Christian
outsiders want to deprive them of their religion and way of
life. Enmity between Christian and Muslim Filipinos in the
twentieth century has often been fueled by the movement of
large numbers of land-hungry Cebuanos , Ilokanos, and other
Filipinos into parts of Mindanao that the Moros have
7
considered their own.
Nur Misuari, a key leader of the Muslim hard-liners
has claimed that the Moro National Liberation Front has made
its
final, unalterable, and irreversible decision to
return to the original objective of seeking the
complete freedom and independence of the Bangsamoro
oeople and their national homeland of Mindanao,
Basilan, Sulu, and Palawan."
Since there has been no immigration to Palawan,
there have been no problems on that island from the Moros,
even though it is part of their traditional homeland. Nor
is it anticipated that the building of a U.S. base on the
northern end of the island would, per se, cause any problems
2. NPA
Like the Moros, the NPA might be thought to be a
possible problem were the U.S. to attempt to get a site in
the southern Philppines. This might be true for many of the
islands, but not for Palawan. If there are any NPA on
Palawan, which is not very likely since the island is so
isolated and so unaffected by the government in Manila, they
are virtually inactive. Palawan is not their kind of place.
The New People's Army is not a spontaneous popular
movement. campaigning for human rights and agrarian reform.
The NPA is the military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) . It follows classic Marxist-Leninist
tactics adapted by Mao and applied in a Philippine context.
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It is the recruiting and proselytizing organ of the CPP
,
and it provides the political and administrative infrastruc-
ture for "liberated" areas in the countryside.
Relying for the most part on techniques borrowed
directly from Chinese and Vietnamese communists, the NPA
exploits problems in the society, such as the loss of confi-
dence in the Marcos regime, recurrent military abuses and
the deteriorating economic situation, far more than it
relies on communist indoctrination to win converts.
The NPA has an organized presence in 80% of the
Philippines 1 73 provinces and is especially strong in cer-
tain areas of Mindanao, central, northern and southern
Luzon, and several of the Visayan Islands in the middle of
the archipelago. This illustrated in Figure 9. There has
been no NPA activity on Palawan, nor has there been any
militarization like that in the rest of the country, as
shown in Figure 10. The NPA influence in the countryside
is expanding. Its greatest strengths are the abuse,
inefficiencies, corruption and complacency of a regime long
in power.
Obtaining reliable strength figures for the NPA is
difficult. Until recently, the Philippine Government down-
played the insurgent threat, at least in part to defend its
original rationale for martial law. Officials suggested
that at most only a few thousand guerrillas existed in the
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Figure 10. Map of Militarization
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when President Marcos stated publicly that there were at
least 6,800 armed guerrillas. The NPA, for its part,
claims to have obtained 20,000 weapons by the end of 1983.
Although there is no way of knowing for sure, many observers
believe that the NPA claim more nearly reflects the true
state of affairs. The NPA probably can now field some
10,000-12,500 full-time armed guerrillas, and an additional
910,000 part-time militia soldiers.
F. ATTITUDES OF FILIPINOS
Since it is estimated that neither the Moros nor the
NPA would have any objection to the idea of the U.S. moving
to a new base site on Palawan, the next questions are what
would be the attitude of the people of the Philippines and
of their government?
Most likely there would be little objection, if any,
from either of these groups. (This is not to say that there
would be no objection, since "you can't please all the
people.") For different reasons, both of these groups
would likely favor such a move by the U.S.
The people of the Philippines have a love-hate relation-
ship with the U.S. Though they do not want the U.S. to
control their government, and thus many of them say "Yankee
Go Home," at the same time they do not want to be left all
alone in the cold, cruel world. What they want is more like
a family-style relationship than a business one. We know
how we both love and hate our close relatives. But that
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does not mean that we want our relatives to throw us out of
the house and change the locks
.
The people of the Philippines definitely want a U.S.
presence in the Philippines. All observers of the Philippines
agree on this. Given a choice between keeping the U.S.
presence at Clark and Subic, or having the U.S. move com-
pletely out of the country, there is no doubt that the
Filipino people prefer the status quo. How would they feel
about the U.S. moving to Palawan? At the very least they
would have no objection and, once they realize the advan-
tages, they would support it.
The same is true for the businessmen and the government
of the Philippines, since the advantages of the U.S.'s
movement would accrue more directly to them. These advantages
come from the increased economic activity in the southern
Philippines, due to having the U.S. base there, and from the
possibilities that can be opened up in the areas the U.S.
will vacate.
G. ATTITUDES OF OTHER COUNTRIES
Most of the rest of the people in Southeast Asia are
interested in seeing a strong U.S. presence in the Philippines,
in large part because the U.S. is a peace-keeping and
sea-patrolling presence. Though it is not directly a
question of "aligning" with either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.,
as in a bipolarized world, if the U.S. were to leave, the
locals, who tend to get very worried about encroachment by
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the Chinese, would look towards whatever kind of counter-
weight was available.
H. PURCHASE VS. LEASE
Two obvious questions are, "why buy instead of lease,"
and "would any sovereign nation sell part of its territory."
Purchase does seem a fantastic idea, but it has two
advantages: the first is that it makes a strong statement
about the permanence of U.S. presence in Southeast Asia;
the second is that a purchase gives a definite distance from
the government of the Republic of the Philippines— it is a
finished business deal that leaves open no questions of
influence or blackmail, jurisdiction or control.
Second, would any sovereign government sell any part of
its territory? Well, why not? The skeptic points out that
a lease allows them to throw out the lessor, if they so
desire, and regain use of the land. This is true. But
land gets sold, traded, or conquered all the time, all over
the world. Just because two sovereign nations are involved,
instead of two private citizens or two corporations, does
not change the fact that people sell because it is the
better deal to do so.
For one thing, the buyer wants to buy, not lease, so
if they want the profits, they sell or don't get anything.
Also, both sides will look at the total balance of all
factors involved in the deal in deciding whether to buy
or to lease. Given the many advantages which come from
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having a new, permanent, basing site for the U.S. (such
as the economic growth which will come from the construction
and services provided to the base) ; from opening the facili-
ties at Clark and Subic for commercial expansion of Manila
at low cost; from the increased distance of the U.S. influ-
ence; from the security that U.S. permanence would bring;
from the fact that for all time there has been so little use
for Malampaya Sound and that there seems to be no use (this
harbor is the only natural asset: there is little fishing,
no agriculture, and no room for population expansion)
;
that it removes the nuclear magnet of the U.S. base from
Manila and any other population center; it is not unlikely
that the owner of the land could decide that selling could
be as good if not better than leasing.
The greatest of these arguments is the political one,
of the relationship between the U.S. and the Republic of
the Philippines. If the land is bought and not leased, it
removes the argument that the U.S. is applying pressure to
control the R.P. government because the U.S. so desperately
needs to keep the bases. It shows this to both the citizens
of the R.P. and the players in the international arena.
It shows that the governments of the U.S. and the R.P.
are not interdependent, but separate and friendly.
Though purchase is clearly best, it might be more
feasible at the beginning to lease the land, with a stated
intent of purchase, and prepare some minimal facilities such
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as anchorages and storage facilities at the site. Later
would come the actual purchase and buildup of the facili-
ties. This more gradual approach might help everyone get
accustomed to the idea.
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Three things must be considered by anyone going into a
negotiation: what outcomes are desired; those who will
be involved in the negotiating; and (for lack of a better
phrase) the political climate. The relative importance of
these varies in each separate negotiation. The third
item is, of course, the hardest to control, and can often
prove to be the most important, as it usually sets the
'tone 1 for the negotiations.
The very obviousness of this often causes people to
forget that the other two parts of the "negotiation tri-
angle" are also very important, especially in the case of
negotiations with the R.P. The flashiness of President
Marcos' actions, which set the political climate, can blind
us to the fact that the U.S. has had a long history of working
with the R.P., giving a great depth and complexity to our
relationship; a relationship which is stronger and more
important than the vicissitudes of a political relationship
dependent on a man like Philippine President Marcos.
In the case of the Philippines, it is important that we
remember that the current problems caused by Marcos are
only an aberration in the democratic climate of the R.P.
It is important that we look beyond the "political climate"
and keep in mind the other two considerations noted above
when conducting negotiations. We can better emphasize the
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lasting nature of our relationship with the people of the
Philippines by paying attention to the goals of the negotia-
tion and to the training of the negotiators. Preparations
in these two areas will demonstrate our concern for the
people of the Philippines, and not just their current leader.
A. DETERMINING GOALS
When talking about goals, I am referring to both the
specific, concrete, measurable goals as well as the unmeas-
urable and usually unstated goals such as maintaining long-
term friendliness between the U.S. and the R.P. These less
distinct goals are just as important as the stated ones, if
not more so. Before going into a set of negotiations, the
question should be asked about not only what do we want to
get, but also, where do we want to be. In the case of
negotiations with the R.P., this will include such items as
maintaining friendly relations, thinking as much of the
Filipino needs as we do of our own, etc. It should not be
as much a matter of what we want, as of the best way to
give each side as much as possible of what they each want.
Instead of looking at negotiation as part of the
totality of a relationship, most people, especially the
participants, tend to think of each case of negotiation in
isolation, and to treat it as a zero-sum game, where anything
gained by one side causes an equal loss for the other side.
However, the unmeasurable-type goals stated above don't fit
into a zero-sum format.
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The choices, then, are to discard these goals because
they don't fit, or, to change our attitudes and strategies
and incorporate all of our goals. In fact, many are begin-
ning to advocate a change. They feel that negotiating
should not be thought of as a zero-sum game. In his address
at the University of Washington in Seattle in November 1961,
the late President Kennedy said,
It is a test of our national maturity to accept
the fact that negotiations are not a contest spelling
victory or defeat. They may succeed, they may fail,
but they are likely to be successful only if both
sides reach an agreement which both regard as
preferable to the status quo, an agreement in which
each side can consider that its own situation has
been improved.
Even so, diplomats and negotiators have usually gone
to the negotiating table in a zero-sum frame of mind, with
a clear idea of exactly what they are supposed to 'get'
and what they may 'give up.' However, these predetermined
positions are not necessarily conducive to successful
negotiations.
A 1962 study of 'conferences' showed that when
the participants functioned as representatives of
groups, with prepared answers, they were much more
rigid and uncompromising in their positions, and
unwilling to change, so that deadlocks commonly
occurred. In addition, they were usually unable
to judge the quality of the solutions objectively.
Clearly, rigid adherence to prior commitments is
not the best preparation for finding adequate
solutions to difficult problems .... *
Yet this rigidity seems to typify most international
negotiation. The daily paper prints more reports of dead-
locked negotiations than successful ones. This is why
training in a thoughtful, non-competitive and unabrasive
71
style of negotiation, as mentioned above, a non-zero-sum
style, and insuring that negotiators employ it are as impor-
tant as the setting of the goals.
It is not impossible to break out of the usual mold. A
notable and successful alternative method was used in the
1974 Panama Canal negotiations, and again in negotiations
for amendments to the Military Bases Agreement in the
Philippines in 1978.
B. A CASE STUDY IN 'THOUGHTFUL NEGOTIATING'
In the June, 1974 Panama Canal negotiations, the U.S.
negotiators used a consulting firm to help formulate a
negotiating strategy. The consultants interviewed members
of the negotiating team, and on the basis of the responses
concocted a point scoring system (a value function, which
assigned measurable units to each issue) for the U.S. side.
An example of this was to assign a range in years for the
duration of the agreement. Another was to assign a range
acceptable for the cost of the compensation.
This scoring system reflected the tradeoffs that the
negotiating team deemed appropriate, with all viewpoints and
pressures informally incorporated. A consensus, if attempted,
would not have been achieved, but the team wanted a means
of articulating some of their trade-offs because they antici-
pated a need for such knowledge in the external negotiation
process
.
Besides giving a value function to each of the issues
and assigning importance weights for the U.S. side (a task
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that would have been divisive if done in conjunction with
interested parties within the government) the team also
recorded their individual perceptions of the Panamanian
*
position on the importance of each of the items.
After interviewing, the consultants, using the additive
scoring systems devised, generated the 'efficient frontier 1
of possible treates and constructed a number of possible
treaties, whose scores fell within the efficient frontier.
Members of the U.S. team were then assigned roles, and
simulated bargaining sessions were conducted to develop a
feel for the approaching. negotiations . It also helped them
to explore alternative packages of issues and to construct




In the 1978 negotiations of amendments to the Military
Bases Agreement with the Philippines, a similar analysis of
the issues was replicated. In both cases the scoring systems
were not used during the actual negotiations, but were
employed between sessions to help the team adjust to the
changes in the situation.
Besides the usefulness of such an analysis in training
the negotiating team, and helping them chart the progress of
*
It was regarded as particularly important by the
reporter of the analysis (Raiffa, 1982) that all of this
took place internal to the negotiating team. Interested
U.S. governmental bodies were not consulted, because such
agencies have widely differing concerns and strong allegiances
to their vested interests, unlike the negotiators who also
have a strong desire to negotiate.
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negotiations, and the movement and pattern of concession,
the people involved felt that one of the most important
benefits of the analysis was a generated creativity.
It gets people to think about the integrative
aspects of bargaining, not only the distributive
ones," said one of the team members. "Typically,
people approach a negotiation thinking only about
their own position, about how to defend it, and
(if they must) about compromise without actually
giving up anything. The analysis draws people into
thinking about how they can improve their own total
score by trading off asymmetric interests.
^
This kind of thoughtful preparation should be obligatory
for any interaction between the U.S. and the Philippines.
C. TRAINING OF NEGOTIATORS
Negotiators must be trained not only in the art of
negotiating but also in the record and background of the
U.S.-R.P. Military Base negotiations. This should include
as a minimum, the history of the Philippines, their culture,
psychology, and sociology. Negotiators should know the
people they are dealing with and the real, as well as the
apparent, reasons for the negotiations. This cultural back-
ground is possibly even more important than training in
skills of negotiation.
At the present time, however, most of those involved in
negotiations have had no training in the field of negotia-
tion, nor is it currently acknowledged as necessary.
Elliot Richardson said, "I never thought of myself
as [anything in particular] , I simply tried to do a
good job. But I suspect now they will be writing
about my appointments from now on in terms of my
experience as a 'negotiator.' Perhaps some day I
will find out what that is."
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This remark illustrates that even such a skilled nego-
tiator was merely "trying to do a good job." This sense is
widespread among diplomats, many of whom believe that, if
negotiations require special skills, these come through an
acquired 'feel of things' and are beyond capture and trans-
4
mission as rules and theories. This unfortunate attitude
ignores the large body of writing by negotiators of previous
times who attempted to capture the essence of negotiation
in order to pass it on to future practitioners. This attitude
also ignores the more recent results of scientific studies
of negotiating situations.
Negotiators should be and can be trained in negotiation.
They don't have to learn only through experience. The
necessary information is available, and its utilization will
not only produce better negotiators, but better negotiations.
The changes produced by such an approach toward negotiation
are felt by some to be able to offer new hope in the inter-
national arena. Otto Klineberg has written that such a new
approach would be successful and would have four characteristics
First, it would be more flexible because rigidity inhibits
any receptivity to fresh ideas or proposals and results in
freezing positions at the status quo. Second, it would be
more understanding, taking into account how the situation
appears to both sides, how our actions look to them, how
our suggestions will be interpreted by those who see the
world from a different perspective.
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Third, it would be less suspicious of the motives of
others, and more willing to chance the possibility that a
sincere desire for peace is not the monopoly of one side.
Fourth, it would be less greedy. It would approach the
conference table not with the insistence that "our" side
has to win, but with the readiness to find a solution that is
reasonably satisfactory to both sides.
With the adoption of negotiating attitudes such as
Klineberg proposes, and with such tools as the analysis and
value system already used informally previously in the
Panama and Philippine negotiations, future efforts might
well be more effective.
It is not time to trace the histories of the Philippine
Islands, and of the U.S.-R.P. negotiations. Suffice it to
point out that acquaintance with these for the negotiators
is both simple good manners and a way to prevent the "re-
invention of the wheel."
It is worthwhile, however, to highlight the importance
of cultural impact. Contrary to popular belief, people
everywhere don't want the same things. Different cultures
produce peoples whose perceptions of the world are quite
different. On top of this, one's own culture causes bias
and a closed system, unappreciative that there are other
"right" ways to do things.
Thus, the blindman ' s-buf f analogy is a much over-
simplified example of the situation we face when we
interact with members of other cultures or even
variants of our own culture. This means that if one is
to prosper in this new world without being unexpectedly
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battered, one must transcend one's own system. To
do so, two things must be known: first, that there
is a system; and second, the nature of that system.
«
This knowledge of the nature of the system of another
culture is not quickly or easily acquired. Most Americans
know little more about the Philippines than the name of its
president, if that. Even the informed public knows only
the American side of the relationship.
It is important that the negotiators become familiar
with the import of such trends as rising nationalism in
the Philippines, the effects of the high population growth
rate, Philippine relationships with ASEAN and Japan, and
the popular attitudes towards their incumbent politicians.
D. CHOICE OF NEGOTIATORS
While training of the people chosen to negotiate, as
outlined above, is absolutely essential, almost as important
is the selection of the negotiation team. The U.S. should
select the right people to do the actual negotiating, people
who are chosen because of their personality characteristics,
and who have no duties which might interfere with their
efforts at negotiation.
The Mutual Defense Board, on which top Philippine
officers sit with the commanders of Subic Bay Naval Base,
Clark Air Base, the Ambassador, and several others, makes
Filipinos feel part of the American process, and is a useful
communications link, but it is peripheral to American policy,
and has no real power. In addition, each of the American
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hierarchies, and particularly their leaders, tend to develop
cross-cutting and informal alliances with one or another of
the Philippine strong men. For some time, American diplomacy
in the Philippines has been governed by the questionable
premise that objectives cannot be achieved through institu-
tions, only through effective and powerful men. The Manila
diplomatic system develops 'personalities' within the American
community that exacerbates the problem, which is only to be
7
expected in such a personality-oriented system.
Officers at the level of CINCPACFLT or COMNAVBASEPHIL
should not be involved in the details of negotiation.
Details should be worked out by junior officers; ones who
have been picked and trained for the jobs, particularly
ones who don't have jobs to defend.
As mentioned above, the negotiating officers should be
trained not only in international negotiations, and the
sociology and psychology of the Filipino people, but first
should be picked for their own psychological and physical
characteristics. Though a number of characteristics are
relevant in this connection, we will only examine a few.
An extremely important trait to look for in U.S. nego-
tiators is their empathetic tendencies. This has been
defined as "social sensitivity" or "the ability to size up
people." It is directly related to the ability to get
along with people of other ethnic groups. It is also
closely connected to a person's lack of racial prejudices.
A reliable way to find empathetic people is to pick
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non-authoritarian types, since it has been shown that empa-
thetic tendencies are inversely proportional to authoritarian
o
tendencies. What is commonly done, though, is not to choose
people for their selected personality characteristics, but
to choose front-running senior officers, John Wayne types,
who are representative of the ideal leader, not the ideal
negotiator.
Physically, a lot of these representatives also resemble
John Wayne . In the past, typically the whole American team
has towered over the Filipino team. It would go far toward
setting an atmosphere of equality if the members of the U.S.
team were as close as possible to the size of the Filipinos.
When looking for the right people to choose as nego-
tiators, the results of a recent study at Dartmouth College
on the subject of negotiation styles should be considered.
The results show that
people with more traditionally feminine personalities
(mostly women) approach negotiations from a win-win
strategy that brings results while preserving good
feelings on both sides. Those with a more masculine
personality (primarily men) employ a sports-oriented
win-lose style.
9
In this study, they found that the feminine students
were more flexible, more willing to compromise, less
deceptive and more likely to view the negotiations as part
of a long-term relationship. These "feminine" personalities
are exactly the right kind to be conducting negotiations for
us in the Philippines.
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E. THE MEETINGS
This idea of a long-term relationship is very important.
That's the way the Filipinos look at it, and it's the best
way to go about the negotiations. That's why the Mutual
Defense Board was established in the first place, to make
contact and talking routine, rather than something special.
This routinized-type of contact should also be incorporated
into the negotiation meetings.
A senior Naval officer involved in one of the Philippine
Base negotiations tells of his having to start his working
day in Subic Bay, then helicopter to Manila for the negotia-
tions. After a full day in Manila, he had to return to
Subic Bay and work for several hours on his regular job.
Some days he went back to Manila for an evening session on
top of everything else. It's easy to imagine that he (as
well as everyone else) was exhausted during all this.
Negotiations shouldn't be conducted at such a breakneck,
exhausting pace. Not that they should continue indefinitely,
but relaxed is better than pressured. Towards that end,
the setting should be selected just as the people were
selected: it should be the best kind to show a long-term
nature and equality in our relationship. In addition, it
should have more of a Filipino nature than an American
one
.
To begin with, the setting should not be Manila, but
Baguio, where life moves slower and there are fewer distrac-
tions. This would give the participants a chance to "work
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together" informally as well as formally. They could get
together over tennis, golf, swimming, etc. This informal,
relaxed atmosphere should be enforced by not permitting
uniforms after working hours. Everyone should wear the
Filipino "barong tagalog," especially at the various official
cocktail parties and suppers.
The working schedule should be equally relaxed. It
should be a 4-day work week, not a 6-day one, with a few
days break to refresh everyone. Filipino customs must be
observed, most especially the custom of "presentos." These
gifts need not be expensive ones, but nice--silver cigarette
cases, invitations to speak at the Naval Postgraduate School,
etc.
Such ideas as these may seem a little simplistic and
perhaps unnecessary, but remember the story of the Naval
officer commuting from Manila to Subic for an example of
how we usually run negotiations.
81
CHAPTER VI NOTES
1. Klineberg, Otto, The Human Dimension in International
Relations (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 147.
2. Raiffa, Howard, The Art and Science of Negotiation
(Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 176-177.
3. Ibid., pp. 185-186.
4. Zartman, I. William and Berman, Maureen R. , The Practical
Negotiator (Yale University Press, 1982)
, p. 1.
5. Klineberg, The Human Dimension
, pp. 146-147.





7. Thompson, W. Scott, Unequal Partners (Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath and Company, 1975)
, pp. 8, 27, 57.
8. Klineberg, The Human Dimension
, pp. 125-126.
9. McLeod, Beverly, "Let's Make a Deal—with a Woman,"
Psychology Today, September, 1984, p. 15.
82
VII. SUMMARY
It is acknowledged that the U.S., for its own national
security interests, should maintain a presence in Southeast
Asia for the protection of the sea lanes, to counter the
growing Soviet presence, and to maintain goodwill and a
stable relationship with the governments in the area. This
U.S. presence is also desired by most of the governments in
the region.
The U.S. facilities in the Philippines are one-of-a-kind.
They offer the U.S. everything needed to fulfill all of our
missions in Southeast Asia. However, these facilities are
not an unmixed blessing. There are several political and
social problems which are caused or exacerbated by the close,
large U.S. presence. These include the questions about U.S.-
R.P. interdependence, the "nuclear magnet," and the cost
of administration for both countries.
If for any reason the U.S. had to leave the bases in the
Philippines, there is currently no really good alternative.
No other U.S .-controlled location is suitably located to
accomplish the same missions in the Indian Ocean and South
China Sea. Nor do any of these localities, for one reason
or another, lend themselves easily to expansion. Another
problem is that these locations do not have an adequate,
available work force.
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There are several sites which are suitably located,
though not U .S .-controlled. These include Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore. These sites also suffer from the lack of
capability for expansion, and they have the added problem
of the political difficulties, as well as some problems with
the use of the labor force. Singapore has the additional
complication that its location is equally good and bad,
depending on the situation.
All the sites in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are
located too far from the South China Sea to be useful.
Locations in the Indochinese peninsula are politically
impossible to consider.
Since none of the developed sites are really suitable,
the other alternative is to find a site in a strategic and
politically viable location, in the sea lanes and away from
the population centers, and to build a new U.S. base there.
Because it would need more construction, it would seem to be
harder and more costly to get into usable condition, but
very likely the situation would be easier to control and
perhaps cheaper, since there would be many fewer variables.
There would be no local population to inconvenience; workers
would be brought in by contracts, which can be changed.
No matter which alternative site is being considered.,
there is no escaping the fact that it will be costly to
build new facilities to replace the Philippine facilities.
This cost is compounded by the many factor noted above.
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But the important thing to remember is that these costs must
not be looked at in isolation: they must be weighed against
the costs, both financial and political of staying where we
are, and against the costs we would incur if we had to move to
the best current alternative, Guam, and operate out of there
for any length of time.
The U.S. must have some carefully considered viable
alternative to the present bases in the Philippines. No
single really good alternative exists and, except for
southern Taiwan, no site could become suitable.
The U.S. should simply recognize that the best solution
is to analyze our current and future needs, find and buy a
site, and build a new base complex which will fill these
needs. To that end, this paper has proposed that the U.S.
purchase the northern end of the Philippine island of
Palawan and build a complete base complex there.
The proposed location is well-located strategically, on
the South China Sea, has the best natural harbor in the
Philippines, is sparsely populated and over 200 miles from
any population center, has excellent natural storm protec-
tion, no volcanoes, and good access to the inexpensive
skilled labor of the Philippines.
It is anticipated that there will be no significant
objection to this proposal from any group in the area,
except perhaps the Marcos opposition group, the Anti-Bases
Coalition, who want the bases completely out of the
Philippines.
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Costs of building a new facility to replace Clark and
Subic have been estimated to be at least $2 billion, not
including the cost of the land. In the long run, though,
pursuing this option would be less expensive than staying
where we are, because we would have more direct control
over the costs. It would also be much less expensive to
build and to operate on Palawan than Guam or anywhere else
because we would be using the less expensive Filipino laborers
Just like running a football team, negotiations must
be carefully managed. The right people must be chosen, they
must be trained, and to do their best, they must have the
right setting. Goals must be set, with the long-term ones
being more important than each individual play or game, or
round of negotiation. The big difference is that negotia-
tions should be approached in a win-win frame of mind, not
a win-lose attitude, as it's called in sports, or zero-sum
game, as it's called in politics, and that the unstated
long-term goals are often more important than the subject
under discussion.
In particular, in negotiations the "other side" must be
carefully studied and understood. In fact, in a case such
as this, playing the game by their rules is really the
best way to "win."
That's what has been proposed in this paper: a completely
different way of looking at the old planner's qeustion,
"what if the U.S. were to lose the basing facilities in the
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Philippines." I have proposed that we ask ourselves instead,
"what would be the best long-range position for the U.S.
in Southeast Asia."
Since it is in our national interests to maintain a
strong presence there, the best way to achieve it is to have
a site which we own, completely under our own control.
Here we would be able to give strong signals of our intent
to all nations in the area, and worldwide, while removing




Abaya, Hernando, J., The Untold Philippine Story (Malaya
Books, Inc., Quezon City, Philippines, 1967).
Agoncillo, Teodoro A., A Short History of the Philippines
,
Mentor Books, 1969.
The American Assembly, Columbia University, The United
States and the Philippines (Prentice-Hall, 1966).
Chawla, Sudershan and Sardesai, D.R. eds
.
, Changing Patterns
of Security and Stability in Asia (Praeger, 19 80).
Cottrell, Alvin J. and Moorer, Thomas H., "U.S. Overseas
Bases: Problems of Projecting American Military Power
Abroad," The Washington Papers , vol. V, no. 47 (Sage
Publications, 1977).
Hagerty, Herbert G. , Forward Deployment in the 1970 's and
1980
' s , National Security Affairs Monograph 77-2
(National Defense University Research Directorate, 1977)
Harrison, Selig S., The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism
and American Policy (The Free Press, Macmillan, 1978)
.
Menendez , Joseph C. , Influence: U.S. National Interests
and the Republic of the Philippines (M.A. Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, 1981).
Taylor, George E., The Philippines and the United States:
Problems of Partnership (Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).
Environments for U.S. Naval Strategy in the Pacific-Indian
Ocean Area, 1985-1995 , Report of a conference sponsored
by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.,
for the United States Naval War College, Center for




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 014 2 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
4. Center for Naval Analyses 1
2000 North Beauregard Street
P.O. Box 11280
Alexandria, Virginia 22311
5. Professor Stephen Jurika Jr., Code 56Jk 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
6. Professor Claude A. Buss, Code 56Bx - 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
7. Professor Boyd Huff, Code 56Hf 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
8. The Hoover Institution on War, 1
Revolution and Peace
Stanford, California 94305
9. Commander in Chief, Pacific 1
Box 2 8
Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii 96861
10. Commander in Chief 1
U.S. Pacific Fleet
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 96860
89
11. Commander in Chief
Pacific Air Force
• Hickam AFB , Hawaii 96853
12. President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840
13. LCDR Cheri Conilogue
SWOS DH87 Building #446
NETC, Newport, Rhode Island 02841
14. 1LT Alan Conilogue
7041 Hummel Street
Boise, Idaho 83709
15. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Plans, Policy, and Operations
Code 60
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350
16. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Plans, Policy, and Operations
Code 605
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350
17. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Plans, Policy, and Operations
Code 612
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350
18. Deputy Chief of Staff
Plans and Operations
AF/XOXXP
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330
19. Deputy Chief of Staff
Programs and Resources
AF/PRPJC
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330




21. U.S. Defense Attache
American Embassy, Manila
c/o Department of State
Main State Building
Washington, D.C. 20520




23. Dr. Lela Noble
Dept . of Asian Studies
San Jose State University
San Jose, California 95192




25. Mr. Larry Niksch
Library of Congress
Congressional Research Service
101 Independent Ave. S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20540
26. Mr. Everett Bierman
House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510
91




New bases for old:
an unusual view of the
Philippine bases pro-
blem.








New bases for old:
an unusual view of the
Philippine bases pro-
blem.

